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Abstract
Production risks can be caused by indirect factors such as weather, and direct
factors such as price. Failure of constructing resilient financial markets to mitigate
these price risks, can cause damaging and lasting impacts to the economy. This
study contributes to the literature on risk and uncertainty by testing the effect of
insurance, both full and partial, on producer behavior in the face of price risk. I use
an experimental setting to addresses the relationship between behavior under price
risk uncertainty, and how that behavior is shaped in the presence of insurance. I
find that participants do not adjust their production choices in situations of price
risk. When provided with insurance, they do increase production significantly, and
reduce it when it is unavailable. The positive effect of full insurance, is higher than
that of partial insurance. By comparing the effect of partial, and full insurance, I
find evidence for moral hazard.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of risk, human behavior can cause individuals to react irrationally.
While it seems intuitive for an individual to give a higher order of preference for
positive outcomes with a higher certainty, this does not eliminate the possibility
of risk taking behavior. In light of price uncertainty, providing insurance can lead
producers to be risk averse. For example, increasing production when insured
would be a clear indication of moral hazard for a risk averse producer. However,
previous research has found that producers increase production in the case of price
risk and uncertainty on the extensive margin (Bellemare et al., 2018); an increase
in production could indicate risk taking behavior. While these two ideas have
been studied, the dynamics of them occurring at the same time are unclear.
Production risks can be caused by indirect factors such as weather, and direct
factors such as price. Failure of constructing resilient financial markets to mitigate
these price risks, can cause damaging and lasting impacts to the economy. This is
a growing concern especially for small farmers in developing countries, especially
due to higher poverty rates, higher uncertainty in production, lack of credit, etc .
Risk preferences are an empirical issue, and thus, experimental economics provides
a foundation for estimating risk preferences. Although there have been several
studies focusing on producer behavior under conditions of market uncertainty,
None of them have observed, in an experimental setting, how that behavior would
compare to a situation of price uncertainty with the availability of insurance. This
study uses an experimental setting addresses the relationship between behavior
under price risk uncertainty, and how that behavior is shaped in the presence of
insurance.
Ganderton et al. estimate the willingness to pay for insurance and find that
the probability of purchasing insurance increased with the probability of a loss,
but the results from their experiment have a lack of generalizability. Laury et
al. (2009) use experimental evidence and find confounding results to prior in-
surance purchasing literature, showing that individuals buy more insurance for
lower-probability events than they buy for high-probability events, given constant
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expected losses. They find these results especially since people pay attention to
risks when the likelihood of occurrence rises over a certain threshold. However, the
uptake of buying insurance in several randomized controlled trials (RCTs) (Cole
et al.(2013), Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012), and Hill and Robles (2011)) has
been consistently low, making insurance a difficult topic of study.
The theoretical model and protocol used of this paper, is mostly a replication
of the study by Sandmo (1971). The experimental design is closest to the exper-
iment by Bellemare et al. (2018) and is an extension of their experiment with
an additional randomization stage of insurance. The paper proposes a four-stage
randomization experiment. In the first stage, the producers are randomly assigned
to either of the two situations of price certainty or price uncertainty. Then, the
level of price risk is allowed to randomly vary in the cases of price uncertainty.
Conditional on a set-up of price uncertainty, the producers are further randomly
provided insurance. In the last stage, random assignment of partial or full in-
surance (conditional on insurance provision) is offered. Thus, producer output
choice making behavior under price uncertainty is studied, followed by studying
any change, if at all, in that behavior after presenting a situation of partial or full
insurance.
This study contributes to the literature on risk and uncertainty by testing the
effect of insurance, both full and partial, on producer behavior in the face of price
risk. It is an attempt at collecting experimental evidence for testing these effects,
which can be later used as a foundation to expand this methodology in the field
for future lab-in-the-field experiments.
The results of this paper are in alignment with those found by Bellemare et
al. (2018) in that participants do not adjust their production choices in situations
of price risk. Interestingly, when provided insurance, they do increase production
significantly, and reduce it when it is unavailable. The positive effect of full insur-
ance, is higher than that of partial insurance. By comparing the effect of partial,
and full insurance, I find evidence for moral hazard.
The remainder of this document proceeds as follows. The paper begins by
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reviewing past literature on insurance and producer behavior in the face of price
uncertainty. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework. Section 4 explains the
experimental design and the two games that subjects played in the lab. Then,
in section 5, the descriptive statistics the data are stated followed by section
6 which explains the empirical model. In section 7, I discuss the experimental
results. Section 8 summarizes the findings and concludes with discussing the
future research that can follow in this direction.
2 Literature review
Most previous research on insurance has been related to a non-price index. Hazel
et al. (2010), for example, talk about index insurances in several developing
countries. However this paper focuses at situations where the price movements
can be monitored and studied, resulting in scope for developing insurance which
would help reduce the price risks. Hazell (1992) states that an insurable risk
has three characteristic- the quantifiable nature of the likelihood of the event,
easily attributable damage and no effect of behavior on occurrence or damage (eg,
moral hazard) of the event. For this study, damage due price uncertainty can be
measured by the probability of the uncertain settings, this damage is quantifiable
by the losses to the farmers, which makes price risk an insurable risk.
Bellemare et al. (2018) have used experimental methods to test the dynamics
of price risk, on the output levels which are endogenous to the agricultural pro-
ducers. The purpose of this paper, is to extend the experimental methods used
by Bellemare et al. (2018) to understand the role that partial and full insurance
can play in deciding the output levels, conditional on uncertainty in the output
prices. The study by Bellemare et al. (2018) is interesting in that their findings
contradict the general intuition that producers reduce their production quantity
in the face of price risk, as explored by Sandmo (1971). They study subjects in
three experiments in Cornell, Minnesota and Peru and their results that at the
extensive margin, price risk actually causes the producers to increase their produc-
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tion. Studies by Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) on the behavior of agricultural
self-producing households find similar conclusions about invalidity of models of
output price uncertainty. They find that in case of uncertainty, a producer may
choose to over or under produce than the expected profit maximizing quantity.
These results give rise to some important questions such as what benchmarks
are used by policy makers while implementing risk-related decisions, how do pro-
ducers react to the output price and quantity risks and whether the existing in-
surance policies are enabling farmers in making the right production decisions.
This paper attempts at addressing these questions under a lab setting of price risk
uncertainty.
Studying insurance in an experimental setting is especially complicated because
of two main hurdles. Firstly, the take-up for insurance is low (Cole et al, 2013).
This leaves us with very low heterogeneity in the treatment and reduces the power
for assessing the effects of insurance. This paper differs in that the case of ideal
insurance is studied, thus eliminating the possibility of a low take up in addition to
eliminating the case for adverse selection. Secondly, it is difficult to endogenously
assign insurance. Attempts at studying moral hazard (Ramaswami, 1993) and
willingness to pay usually have the limitation that it is difficult to separate the
effect of insurance on decision making and the effect of other factors involved in
production decision making. Since insurance is randomly necessarily offered to all
participants and for free in this experimental design, it is easier to interpret the
exogenous effects of insurance on production.
3 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework mimics Sandmo’s (1971) paper where he considers pro-
ducer’s whose objective function is maximizing the expected utility of the profits.
The utility function is assumed to satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.
The average producer is assumed to be risk averse, and produces only one com-
modity. These conditions are used to study the effect of insurance on production
4
behavior in an uncertain output price.
The concave, continuous and differentiable utility function U(pi) of the pro-
ducer over her profits is such that U ′(pi) > 0 and U ′′(pi) < 0. The profit function
of the firm pi(x) is defined as pi = px−C(x)−FC, where p is restricted to be risky
and non-negative, x > 0, and expected value of output price E[p] = µ. FC is
the “fixed cost”, C(x) is the variable cost function which follows the assumptions
C(0) = 0, and C ′(x) > 0.
The producer makes production decisions ex ante of the determination of the
output price. Therefore, the expected utility function of the producer is
max
x
E[U(px− C(x)− FC)] (1)
The first-order and second-order conditions can be obtained by differentiating with
respect to x as
E[U ′(pi)(p− C ′(x))] = 0 (2)
and
E[U ′′(pi)(p− C ′(x))2 − U ′(pi)C ′′(x)] < 0 (3)
Proposition 1 (Sandmo, 1971) Under the assumptions stated above, a risk-
averse producer will decrease production in the face of price uncertainty relative
to a situation of price certainty where the price equals the mean of the price dis-
tribution.
Proof Equation 2 can be re-written as
E[U ′(pi)p] = E[U ′(pi)C ′(x))] (4)
Subtracting E[U ′(pi)µ] on both sides we get
E[U ′(pi)(p− µ)] = E[U ′(pi)(C ′(x)− µ)] (5)
Since E[pi] = µx−C(x)−FC, from how profits are defined, by rearranging terms
we can get pi = E[pi] + (p− µ)x. This implies that the difference in expected and
realized profits is only because of the ex post price p and the producers expectation
of the price µ. The production decisions are made based on the expected ex post
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price by the producer. If the two prices are equal, p = µ, then E[pi] = pi, i.e. the
expected profits equal the realized prices, which will certainly be the case in the
experiment with rounds of price certainty.
If p ≥ µ, then U ′(pi) ≤ U ′(E[pi]). Therefore,
U ′(pi)(p− µ) ≤ U ′(E[pi])(p− µ) (6)
which holds for all values where p ≥ µ. Taking expectations on both sides of
equation 6,
E[U ′(pi)(p− µ)] ≤ U ′(E[pi])E[p− µ] (7)
The right-hand side equals zero since E[p− µ] = E[p]− µ and E[p] = µ by defini-
tion. This implies that the left-hand side of equation 7 is negative. Substituting
this in equation 5, E[U ′(pi)(C ′(x) − µ) ≤ 0, which means that C ′(x)/leqµ, and
the optimal output is characterized by marginal cost being less than the marginal
benefit of producing that output. This establishes the result that when the price
is uncertain, the producers produce lesser than they would, in the case of certain
price.
4 Methodology and Experimental design
The experiment has nine study arms. First, there is the randomization of price
uncertainty. Which makes the first five study arms- price certainty, and the four
levels of price uncertainty. The sixth and seventh arms are insurance provision
and no insurance provision. Lastly, partial insurance, or full insurance make up
the eighth and ninth study arms.
The participants play two games, and their payoffs are a sum of the payoffs
from each of these individual games. The average payoff for these experiment
games is $56. This ensures a high monetary incentive for the participants to be
truthful and honestly involved in the games. The two games are described below-
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4.1 Price-Risk-Insurance Game
This is the game that the participants played in the lab experiment. It is a close
replication of Sandmo’s (1971) theoretical design, and Bellemare et al.’s (2018)
experimental design. The set up for decision making is described as a list of
procedures. Then, a method of studying the risk preferences of the subjects is
explained which is the lottery choice game used by Holt and Laury (2002).
The participants were asked to pose as producers of a commodity (wheat, in the
lab experiment). First, the participants play 5 practice rounds. Then, they play
25 rounds of the actual experiment. During the practice rounds, the participants
are encouraged to ask questions, to enable a better comprehension of the game.
Randomization is pre-done.
Simple cost and profit functions are used . The fixed cost F is set as F =
15. The variable cost function c(x) is set as c(x) = 2x1.4. This functional form
used to mimic Bellemare et al.’s (2018) set up, and to comply with the theoretical
set up of Sandmo (1971). The profit function pi = px− 2x1.4 − 15. To help them
make decisions, charts displaying the various combinations of output choices, costs,
and profits were handed to the participants. A combined chart for all the possible
prices and outputs and the corresponding outputs was also provided. These charts
can be found in Appendix B, section 2.
The randomization process and the price risk game was played in the following
four stages of the game-
1. Uncertainty- The first stage of randomization was determining price uncer-
tainty. In one-third of the 25 rounds (8 rounds, specifically), the subjects
faced price certainty and thus the price of output would surely be $7 per
bushel of wheat. In the rest of the two-third rounds (17 rounds), the price
was uncertain ranging from $5-$9 per bushel. The participants were told
whether they were in a price certain or price uncertain setting.
2. Level of price risk- After the determination of price uncertainty, there were
four possible levels of price risk. Section 2 of Appendix B displays the various
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price settings show the five distributions and levels of risk that participants
could face. Setting 1 corresponds to price certainty. For each uncertain
round, one of the other four settings was randomly chosen. The participants
were told which level of price risk they were facing and had access to the
figure on their screens. The average price in all the five total settings was
$7. The mean-preserving spreads were used in the price distributions to be
consistent with Sandmo’s (1971) set-up.
3. Insurance- The third stage of randomization was determining insurance. In
one third of the uncertain rounds (6), no insurance was offered. In the rest of
the two third rounds (11), insurance was offered for some or all of the losses
that would occur by choosing a production level. At this point, participants
would know whether they were in an uncertain situation, what the level of
risk they had, and whether they had insurance.
4. Level of insurance- The last stage of randomization was the level of insur-
ance. For half of the uncertain rounds with insurance, participants were
given full coverage for their losses while in the other half, 50% or half of
their losses were covered. The participants knew whether they had price
uncertainty, what level of uncertainty, and whether they would be fully or
partially covered for losses, in case.
The participants made ex ante production decisions after knowing the price and
insurance situation they were in, but the ex post price in the uncertain settings was
determined only after the production decisions were made, by randomly drawing
a ball from the setting.
The software O-tree was used to facilitate the experiment. Each participant
had their own computer screens which displayed the four things mentioned above.
All the participants played the same round, and a common price was drawn for
all the participants. The software ensured that moving to the next screen of price
determination was only permitted after all the participants had entered their pro-
duction choices, so as to keep everyone on the same pace throughout the experi-
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ment.
At the end off the 25 actual rounds, one of the rounds was randomly chosen by
the participant, by drawing a ball from a bag. The participants received a base
payoff of $30 for showing up. In addition to that, the payoffs were calculated as a
base pay-off of $25 plus half of the profits they made. If they made a loss, and if
the round had full insurance, then they get to keep all of the $25. Whereas in the
case of a loss and partial coverage, half of their loss would be covered and they
would lose half of the total half.
4.2 Holt-Laury List Game
The second game the participants played was the Holt-Laury list experiment.
Sandmo’s conclusions about production focus on risk averse participants. Thus,
determining the level of risk aversion for the participants was important to follow
Sandmo’s (1971) experiment design. I used the experiment designed by Holt and
Laury (2002) for eliciting the level of risk aversion for the participants.
For this game, the participants were given a set of lotteries to choose from.
Section 1 of Appendix B displays the Holt-Laury game. The participants were
shown a list of ten rows. Each row had two sets of lotteries which are given as
the two options on the columns, A and B. The participants have to choose one
of the two options for each row. The options in column A are always less risky
than options in column B, and therefore more attractive to risk aversion. The
expected payoffs for option A are higher than expected payffs from option B in
the beginning, but the gap reduces as you go down the rows.
The game is designed in a way to make the participants switch from column A
to column B. Once the participant chooses column B, the game ends. I only allow
for monotonic switching, so as to ensure that the assumptions of EU theory are
satisfied. This method is incorporated from Bellemare et al. (2018), and Magnan
et al. (2018).
The payoffs for the Holt-Laury game are determined as follows. First, the
participant rolls a ten sided die to determine which of the ten rows would determine
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the lottery to be played by the participant. Then, the ten sided is rolled again to
actually play the lottery to determine the payoff for this game.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
The participants for this experiment were recruited using the Carlson School of
Management Paid Subject Pool, and the experiment was conducted in the Social
and Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.
The subject pool was diverse in age, education, and gender.
There were 28 participants in total, and each participant played 25 rounds
of the actual game. Together, this gives a pooled sample of N=700 observations
which are used in studying results of the experiment. Table S1 displays data on
the descriptive statistics for the sample. On average, the price for the rounds was
7, which is intuitive because of the experimental design. The average production
units were 11, and the median production units were 10. This also makes sense,
since the profit maximizing quantity for price 7, is 10 units.
The Figures 1 through 6 are histograms displaying the level of production for
the different scenarios. Fig. 1 shows the output for all the rounds combined.
The profit maximizing output choice for $7 is 10 units, which is the highest fre-
quency output choice. Recollect that the price distributions were mean-preserving
spreads around $7. Fig 2. shows the output choices for the rounds where there
price uncertainty. Figures 3 and 4 show the output choices for insurance and no
insurance, respectively. As expected, the output choices for insured rounds are
more on the higher side than the uninsured rounds. Figures 5 and 6 show the
outputs for partially and fully insured rounds, respectively. The higher output
choices for insured rounds seems to be driven more by the fully insured rounds.
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6 Empirical Framework
Variables of interest and the proposed model
The most important variable of interest in the experiment, is the output choice that
the subjects make. In each round, the subjects make production output decisions.
The subjects were informed that their production behaviors are independent of
the behaviors of other peer producers. It is important to note that these output
decisions were made made after the determination of the setting and the insurance
situation; however, the output decisions were made ex ante of the realization of
the price that the subjects would get for their output choices.
The risk preferences derived from the Holt-Laury game, the Arrow-Pratt co-
efficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) is obtained, which is used to estimate
the marginal effect of risk aversion on output choices. Following Holt and Laury’s
recommendations (2002), constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is assumed and
I obtain Ri which is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion for indi-
vidual i. I assign R as follows: R = -0.95 to subjects who switch in the first line
of the Holt-Laury list experiment, R = -0.49 to subjects who switch in the second
line, R = -0.15 to subjects who switch in the third line, R = 0.15 to subjects
who switch in the fourth, R = 0.41 to subjects who switch in the fifth line, R =
0.68 to subjects who switch in the sixth line, R = 0.97 to subjects who switch in
the seventh line, R = 1.37 to subjects who switch in the eighth line, R = 1.50
to subjects who switch in the ninth or tenth line. The next subsection describes
these desired effects and models the equation of interest for the game. This work
follows the framework from Bellemare et al.’s (2018) paper and extends their anal-
yses by adding insurance to it. It is obvious that in the case where full insurance is
offered, the producers will produce at least as much as they would have produced
under the price certainty situation. In the case where partial insurance is offered,
the producers are expected to make production decisions in an intermediate level
between price risk and price certainty. For testing Sandmo’s assumption that
uncertainty results in decreased production, I test the following equation-
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yit =α + β1I(σt > 0) + δ1Ri + θ1xi + vi + 1it (8)
Where, yit is subject i’s output choice in round τ ∈ (1,. . . ,25), I(σt > 0) is a
dummy variable which equals one if subjects are making that output decision in
face of price risk and equals zero otherwise, Ri denotes subject i ’s Arrow-Pratt
coefficient of relative risk aversion which is obtained from the Holt-lottery game,
xi is a vector of control variables specific to subject i (eg. age, sex, education,
ethnicity), vi is a random effect specific to subject i, and 1it is an error term with
mean zero.
For testing Sandmo’s assumption of uncertainty and decreased production, the
following hypothesis will be tested in the experiment, H0: β1 = 0. If the effect
is significantly different from zero, then the null would be rejected in favor of
the alternative. Additionally, if this effect is also negative, then this would be
analogous to Sandmo’s results.
I add two more specifications- the effect of uncertainty and insurance; uncer-
tainty and partial insurance and uncertainty and full insurance. The following
specification tests for uncertainty and insurance (insurance could be either partial
or full)-
yit =α + β2I(σt > 0) + δ2Ri + θ2xi + γ2I(σt > 0) ∗ I(κt > 0) + vi + 2it (9)
The variables are defined as above, and I(σt > 0) ∗ I(κt > 0) is the interaction
term between uncertainty and insurance. In this specification, I am interested in
testing the hypothesis- H0: γ2 = 0. The rejection of this hypothesis will tell us
that insurance has an effect on production in the presence of uncertainty. The
direction of γ2 will tell us whether insurance under uncertainty has a positive or
a negative effect on production.
The last specification I test is-
yit =α + β3I(σt > 0) + δ3Ri + θ3xi + γ3I(σt > 0) ∗ PI(λt > 0)+
η3I(σt > 0) ∗ FI(φt > 0) + vi + 3it
(10)
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The variables are defined as above, I(σt > 0) ∗ I(λt > 0) is the interaction term
between Uncertainty and Partial Insurance, and I(σt > 0) ∗ I(φt > 0) is the
interaction term between Uncertainty and full insurance. In this specification, we
are interested in testing the following two hypotheses-H0: γ3 = 0, and H0: η3 = 0.
The rejection of this hypothesis will tell us the effects of partial and Full Insurance
on production in the presence of uncertainty. The direction of γ3 and H0: η3 =
0 will tell us whether partial and full insurance under uncertainty have a positive
or a negative effect on production. Note that in the last specification, I do not
have the variable I(σt > 0) ∗ I(κt > 0) as was in equation 9 because full or partial
insurance were only offered in the rounds that had insurance. Additionally, the
experiment design had no cases where the price was certain and insurance was
offered, which explains why there is no interaction term between certainty and
insurance in any of the equations.
The randomization is on subject-level and each subject is followed through the
25 rounds. I use the random effects model to estimate the results and cluster
errors at the individual level, as Abadie et al. (2017) suggest in their paper.
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7 Experimental results
This section follows three parts. In the first part, I discuss the results from
Sandmo’s predictions (i.e. equation 1), and check if the data follow his prediction
that price risk at the extensive margin causes a reduction in production level.
Second, I study how Sandmo’s predictions differ when the producers are provided
with insurance (equations 2 and 3). Then, I estimate the same three equations
for a subset of the sample, restricting it only to risk averse participants. The risk
averse participants are those whose R > 0, or switching point for the Holt-Laury
list game was after row 4.
Since all the subjects saw the same sequence of rounds, it is possible that
there exist some order effects. To account for that, I calculate the results using
fixed effects and present them in table S4. However, after running a Hausman
test pitting the specifications in the table S2 against the same specification but
with subject specific fixed effects, I fail to reject the null with a p-value of 1.00. I
believe this constitutes strong evidence that random effects are preferred in this
context, since random effects are more efficient. Thus, the remainder of the paper
proceeds using results from the random effects model.
Using the experimental design, I find little or no evidence to support Sandmo’s
claim, indicating some invalidity of expected utility theory for this context. The
results in column (1) of Table S2 indicate that participants do not make signifi-
cantly different output decisions in the presence of uncertainty (at the extensive
or the intensive margin). However, in the presence of insurance, significant be-
havioral changes are observed. Column (2) of Table S2 shows that production is
decreased by 1.387 units, when the participants know that the particular round
insures a part or all of their losses. Complementing evidence for the existence of
moral hazard, is the effect of the interaction term between uncertainty and in-
surance on production. When participants are offered insurance in the uncertain
price rounds, they increase production by 2.926 units. Since all the participants
were forced to have insurance in the rounds that it was offered in, we can rule out
the role of market asymmetry in terms of adverse selection. The significance of
14
both the coefficients on uncertainty and the interaction term indicate the existence
of moral hazard.
In column (3) of Table S2, the difference in the positive magnitudes of partial
and full insurance supports the claim for moral hazard and is intuitive. When
the losses are fully insured, participants increased production by 4.333 points
as compared to increasing it by 1.783 point with partially insured losses. The
coefficient of uncertainty is negative which indicates that participants behave in
a risk averse way uncertain rounds when partial and full insurance are controlled
for.
Another interesting result is that the positive effect of insurance under un-
certainty is higher than the negative effect of uncertainty. In Table S2, we can
see that after controlling for insurance, price risk has a significant negative on
the output. However, giving insurance to cover the losses due to the uncertainty,
significantly increases production. This increase in production due to insurance
for uncertainty is almost twice in magnitude of the decrease in production due to
uncertainty. Thus there is a very high negative effect of uncertainty in the absence
of insurance.
In Table S3, data for only the risk averse participants was used to calculate the
equations 1 through 3. Interesting and paradoxical results are observed, since risk
averse subjects are behaving like risk loving, both for uninsured and insured situa-
tions. Column (1) in Table S3 shows that under uncertainty, the risk participants
increase production. In Column (2), when insurance is provided, then produc-
tion is significantly increased, by 3.136 units. And the impact of full insurance is
almost four times that of partial insurance.
8 Conclusion and Discussion
This study is unique in that it is one of the first attempts at testing price risk and
heterogeneous insurance coverage in an experimental lab setting. The experiment
is an extension of Bellemare et al. (2018) and mimics the experimental design of
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Sandmo (1971). I find similar results to Bellemare et al. (2018) in that there is
no significant change in production due to uncertainty at the extensive margin.
However, when insurance is provided, the production is significantly increased,
whereas a reduction in production is observed when there is no insurance available
for the losses.
These results show that there could be some role of moral hazard in the pro-
duction decisions made under uncertainty and insurance availability. However,
provision of insurance could be an incentive for increasing production, in an ideal
setting. Since this experiment was conducted in a lab with mostly undergraduate
students, one could argue about the external validity of the results. Studying in-
surance in the developing world is especially of growing interest now, and whether
similar results would be obtained if this experiment is conducted with farmers
from a developing country is a question worth exploring. Conducting lab-in-the-
field experiments of similar kind could be great addition to the literature of price
risk and insurance.
In this experiment, insurance was provided for no cost, and the participants
had to make decisions assuming that they would not have to bear any cost for the
insurance. It would be valuable to see the impact of insurance when participants
have to pay some price for purchasing insurance, and even better if that price could
be randomly provided at discounted prices. Braun and Muermann (2004) find in-
teresting results about regret theory. It would be interesting to see the interactions
of regret-aversion, in the context of price risk and Expected Utility Maximization
(EUT). Lybbert et al. (2010) find that effects of risk aversion on insurance are
significantly negative, since risk averse people would choose self-financing, which
is the least risky choice, in the absence of free insurance. Experimentally testing
these two ideas along with offering insurance at discounted prices would be good
directions to take this research in.
16
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10 Appendix A
Table S1: Descriptive Statistics (n=700)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max
Output Level 11.04 (2.46) 0 20
Price 6.68 (1.11) 5 9
Uncertainty 0.70 (0.46) 0 1
Standard Deviation 0.84 (0.68) 0 1.58
Profit 2.86 (11.61) -43.39 31.99
Holt-Laury Switch Point 7.21 (1.51) 2 10
Age 31.07 (0.94) 19 68
Female 0.42 (0.49) 0 1
Insurance 0.44 0 1
Partial Insurance 0.24 0 1
Full insurance 0.2 0 1
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Table S2: Random Effects Regression Results for the entire Sample
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Output
I(σ > 0), or Price Risk 0.454 -1.387*** -1.374***
(0.554) (0.510) (0.510)
Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of RRA -0.167 -0.167 -0.167
(0.465) (0.466) (0.466)
Female -0.912** -0.912** -0.912**
(0.430) (0.430) (0.431)
Age -0.0478*** -0.0478*** -0.0478***
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(κt > 0) or Price Risk*Insurance 2.926***
(0.284)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(λt > 0) or Price Risk*PartialInsurance 1.783***
(0.249)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(φt > 0) or Price Risk*FullInsurance 4.333***
(0.397)
N 700 700
R2 Overall 0.011 0.16 0.24
Individual FE YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table S3: Random Effects Regression Results for the risk-averse only Sample
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Output
I(σ > 0), or Price Risk 0.985*** -0.987*** -0.973***
(0.281) (0.272) (0.272)
Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of RRA -1.934** -1.934** -1.934**
(0.804) (0.805) (0.806)
Female -0.475 -0.475 -0.475
(0.326) (0.327) (0.327)
Age -0.0165 -0.0165 -0.0165
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(κt > 0) or Price Risk*Insurance 3.136***
(0.258)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(λt > 0) or Price Risk*PartialInsurance 1.882***
(0.255)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(φt > 0) or Price Risk*FullInsurance 4.678***
(0.335)
N 700 700 700
R2 Overall 0.011 0.16 0.24
Individual FE YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table S4: Fixed Effects Regression Results for the entire Sample
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Output
I(σ > 0), or Price Risk 0.454 -1.387** -1.374**
(0.550) (0.506) (0.507)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(κt > 0) or Price Risk*Insurance 2.926***
(0.282)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(λt > 0) or Price Risk*PartialInsurance 1.783***
(0.247)
I(σt > 0) ∗ I(φt > 0) or Price Risk*FullInsurance 4.333***
(0.394)
N 700 700
R2 Overall 0.010 0.178 0.269
Individual FE YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Figure 1: Output-All
Figure 2: Uncertain rounds
Figure 3: Insured rounds Figure 4: Uninsured rounds
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Figure 5: Partially Insured rounds Figure 6: Fully Uninsured rounds
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11 Appendix B: Experimental Protocol
1- Consent Form, Instructions, and Lottery Choice game answer sheet
25
  
Consent Form 
 
This study involves research in economics and it is being conducted by researchers from the University 
of Minnesota. The purpose of this study is to test some of the predictions of economic theory. You will 
spend 170 to 180 minutes in the laboratory playing economic games for money.  
 
We will “endow” you with an amount of money ($30 plus $25) which you will use in playing the 
economic games you will be playing as part of this experiment. Depending on your performance as part 
of those experimental games, you may win additional money or lose some of the $25 portion of your 
endowment. In some cases, you would receive full or partial insurance, in which your losses or a part of 
your losses will be on us. You will, however, go home with at least $30 to compensate you for your time. 
Note, however, that you might go home with an additional $1.31 to $45.16 depending on your 
performance. Beyond that, there is no direct benefit to participation. 
 
You will face minimal risk by participating in this experiment: the risks include loss of confidentiality and 
potential embarrassment associated with losing money. You will feel no discomfort at all. 
 
The benefits of this research will be to validate an important and hitherto neglected aspect of economic 
theory as well as to inform policy makers about an important area of economic policy. 
 
In the interest of confidentiality, we will not be recording your name, but we will be recording some 
demographic information about you (e.g., age, gender, level of education), and we will obviously be 
recording your actions in the experimental economic games we will have you play. It will not be possible 
from the data to tell who you are, and so all the data provided here today is confidential in its strictest 
sense. 
 
For more information, please contact the Principal Investigator, Professor Marc F. Bellemare, 
Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, by writing to him at mbellema@umn.edu or 
calling him at 612-624-1692. You may also contact Ms. Aditi Kadam, Masters student, Department of 
Economics, University of Minnesota, by writing to her at kadam020@umn.edu or calling her at 319-575-
3920. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or decrease in 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled outside of this experiment. Moreover, you may discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled outside of this 
experiment.  
 
Name (please print): ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Date:   ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature:  ____________________________________________________________ 
1 
 
General Instructions 
• This is an experiment in the economics of individual decision making. We are trying to 
understand how people make production decisions when they are unsure of the price 
they will receive and when they are provided insurance. We have designed simple 
decision-making games in which we will ask you to make choices in a series of situations. 
• There are two sets of games. In the first set of games, you will be making decisions 
assuming that you are a farmer producing a single commodity, wheat. In the second set 
of games, you will be given a series of lotteries to choose from. More detailed 
explanations will follow in each set. 
• You will spend 170 to 180 minutes in this study playing economic games. You will 
automatically receive $30 for participation and in addition may earn between $1.31 and 
$45.15 depending on your performance and also on the luck on the experiment. The 
amount will be transferred on a debit card which will be given to you. 
• You should make your own decision and should not discuss your decisions or the 
decision scenarios with other participants. Also, please turn off your cell phones. 
• You need to have a good understanding on how your decisions affect your payoff. 
Please raise your hand at any time during the session if you have any question. 
• You can access more information about how to use the debit card here-
http://prepaid.umn.edu 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Set I: Single-Commodity Production Game 
• You are a farmer who produces and sells only one commodity, wheat. 
• The selling price of wheat in dollars per bushel will be one of the five possible values: $5, 
$6, $7, $8, and $9, and it will be realized after provision (or no provision) of insurance 
and after you make your production decision to reflect the real-world output price 
uncertainty. 
• You will be given charts 1 through 5 which document the amount of cost to be incurred 
according to production levels 0 through 20 (in 1,000 bushels), and the corresponding 
profit (in $1,000) that will occur under the five different price scenarios. These charts 
contain all the information about how your production decision, cost of production, and 
your profit relate to one another. Chart 6 is a summary of charts 1 through 5 and shows 
only the relationship between the production level and the profit. 
• In each round, you will be given one of the four situations: (1) You know that your 
selling price will be exactly $7; (2) You will be provided full insurance and you know that 
the price will be one of the five values -- $5, $6, $7, $8, and $9; (3) You will be provided 
partial insurance and you know that the price will be one of the five values -- $5, $6, $7, 
$8, and $9; (4) You will not be provided insurance and you know that the price will be 
one of the five values -- $5, $6, $7, $8, and $9. Under a given situation, you will be asked 
to determine how much wheat to produce by choosing any integer between 0 and 20 as 
your production level. You may refer to the charts 1-6 to facilitate your decision. 
• Note that provision of insurance means you will be fully or partially covered for all your 
losses. 
• Your goal is to maximize the profit (price times quantity produced minus cost of 
production), since maximizing profit is identical to maximizing your payoff. 
• Note that there is no subsistence constraint, meaning that there is no minimum 
required level of production for your survival. Nor is there a requirement to make a 
positive profit in order for you to survive. Negative profits mean that you lose some of 
the money that you are endowed with. 
• After provision (or no provision) of insurance and after you have chosen how much to 
produce, a ball will be drawn randomly from a bag, which will determine your selling 
price. You will sell your wheat at that price, which will determine your profit.  
3 
 
• You will first play 5 rounds of practice games. After the practice games, you will play 30 
rounds of the real games. In the real games, your payoff will affect your profits from the 
games.  
• In this set of the game, you start from base payoff of $25. In a given round, your profit 
will be between -47.58 and 32.61. After the 25 actual rounds, we will randomly select a 
round. Your payoff from these games will be determined in the following way: 
• In a case that the selected round had no insurance provided, your final pay off will 
always be: $25 base payoff + a half of your profit in the randomly selected round. For 
example, if you have made a loss of 30 in the selected round, your final payoff will be 
$25 + (-$30 X 0.5) = $10. If you have made a profit of 28, your final payoff will be $25 + 
($28 X 0.5) = $39. 
• In a case that the selected round had full insurance provided, your final pay off will 
always be: $25 base payoff. For example, if you made a loss of 30 in the selected round, 
your final payoff will be (-30) + (25) = $25.  
• In a case that the selected round had partial insurance provided, your final pay off will 
always be: $25 base payoff + half of half of the losses in the randomly selected round. 
For example, if you made a loss of 30 in the selected round, your final payoff will be $25 
+ (-$30 X 0.5 X 0.5). 
• Your final payoff in this set of the games will range between $1.31 and $41.31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Set II: Lottery Choice Game 
• In this set of games, you will be presented a table of ten paired lotteries, A and B, from 
which you are asked to choose one that you prefer. 
• Below is an example of the options that you will be given: 
Option A Option B 
1/10 of $2.00,  
9/10 of $1.60 
1/10 of $3.85,  
9/10 of $0.10 
 
If you choose option A, there is a probability of 0.1 that you will be receiving $2.00, and 
a probability of 0.9 that you will be receiving $1.60. If you choose option B, there is a 
probability of 0.1 that you will be receiving $3.85 which is much bigger than $2.00 in 
option A. However, there is also a 0.9 probability that you will be receiving only $0.10.  
• Stop once you have chosen the option B. 
• Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered 
from 1 to 10 (the "0" face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your 
choices, we will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, 
and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for 
the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten or less decisions, only 
one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which 
decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the 
end. 
• Your payoff from this round will range between $0.1 and $3.85. 
 
 
Answer Recording Sheet                      ID#:  
Set II: Lottery Choice Game 
 Option A Option B Your Choice (circle one) 
1 1/10 of $2.00, 
9/10 of $1.60 
1/10 of $3.85, 
9/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
2 
2/10 of $2.00, 
8/10 of $1.60 
2/10 of $3.85, 
8/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
3 
3/10 of $2.00, 
7/10 of $1.60 
3/10 of $3.85, 
7/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
4 
4/10 of $2.00, 
6/10 of $1.60 
4/10 of $3.85, 
6/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
5 
5/10 of $2.00, 
5/10 of $1.60 
5/10 of $3.85, 
5/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
6 
6/10 of $2.00, 
4/10 of $1.60 
6/10 of $3.85, 
4/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
7 
7/10 of $2.00, 
3/10 of $1.60 
7/10 of $3.85, 
3/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
8 
8/10 of $2.00, 
2/10 of $1.60 
8/10 of $3.85, 
2/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
9 
9/10 of $2.00, 
1/10 of $1.60 
9/10 of $3.85, 
1/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
10 
10/10 of $2.00, 
0/10 of $1.60 
10/10 of $3.85, 
0/10 of $0.10 
A  ,  B 
Stop once you have chosen the option B. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! ☺ 
 
2- Profit Charts and Settings
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1.   Wheat production, cost, and profit when price of wheat is $5/bushel. 
(1) 
Wheat  
Production 
(1,000 bushels) 
(2) 
Price  
($/bushel) 
 
(3) 
Cost 
 = 2 X (1)1.4+15 
($ 1,000) 
(4) 
Profit  
= (1)X(2)-(3) 
($1,000) 
0 5 15.00 -15.00 
1 5 17.00 -12.00 
2 5 20.28 -10.28 
3 5 24.31 -9.31 
4 5 28.93 -8.93 
5 5 34.04 -9.04 
6 5 39.57 -9.57 
7 5 45.49 -10.49 
8 5 51.76 -11.76 
9 5 58.35 -13.35 
10 5 65.24 -15.24 
11 5 72.41 -17.41 
12 5 79.85 -19.85 
13 5 87.54 -22.54 
14 5 95.47 -25.47 
15 5 103.63 -28.63 
16 5 112.01 -32.01 
17 5 120.60 -35.60 
18 5 129.40 -39.40 
19 5 138.39 -43.39 
20 5 147.58 -47.58 
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2. Wheat production, cost, and profit when price of wheat is $6/bushel. 
(1) 
Wheat  
Production 
(1,000 bushels) 
(2) 
Price  
($/bushel) 
 
(3) 
Cost 
 = 2 X (1)1.4+15 
($ 1,000) 
(4) 
Profit  
= (1)X(2)-(3) 
($1,000) 
0 6 15.00 -15.00 
1 6 17.00 -11.00 
2 6 20.28 -8.28 
3 6 24.31 -6.31 
4 6 28.93 -4.93 
5 6 34.04 -4.04 
6 6 39.57 -3.57 
7 6 45.49 -3.49 
8 6 51.76 -3.76 
9 6 58.35 -4.35 
10 6 65.24 -5.24 
11 6 72.41 -6.41 
12 6 79.85 -7.85 
13 6 87.54 -9.54 
14 6 95.47 -11.47 
15 6 103.63 -13.63 
16 6 112.01 -16.01 
17 6 120.60 -18.60 
18 6 129.40 -21.40 
19 6 138.39 -24.39 
20 6 147.58 -27.58 
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3.  Wheat production, cost, and profit when price of wheat is $7/bushel. 
(1) 
Wheat  
Production 
(1,000 bushels) 
(2) 
Price  
($/bushel) 
 
(3) 
Cost 
 = 2 X (1)1.4+15 
($ 1,000) 
(4) 
Profit  
= (1)X(2)-(3) 
($1,000) 
0 7 15.00 -15.00 
1 7 17.00 -10.00 
2 7 20.28 -6.28 
3 7 24.31 -3.31 
4 7 28.93 -0.93 
5 7 34.04 0.96 
6 7 39.57 2.43 
7 7 45.49 3.51 
8 7 51.76 4.24 
9 7 58.35 4.65 
10 7 65.24 4.76 
11 7 72.41 4.59 
12 7 79.85 4.15 
13 7 87.54 3.46 
14 7 95.47 2.53 
15 7 103.63 1.37 
16 7 112.01 -0.01 
17 7 120.60 -1.60 
18 7 129.40 -3.40 
19 7 138.39 -5.39 
20 7 147.58 -7.58 
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4.  Wheat production, cost, and profit when price of wheat is $8/bushel. 
(1) 
Wheat  
Production 
(1,000 bushels) 
(2) 
Price  
($/bushel) 
 
(3) 
Cost 
 = 2 X (1)1.4+15 
($ 1,000) 
(4) 
Profit  
= (1)X(2)-(3) 
($1,000) 
0 8 15.00 -15.00 
1 8 17.00 -9.00 
2 8 20.28 -4.28 
3 8 24.31 -0.31 
4 8 28.93 3.07 
5 8 34.04 5.96 
6 8 39.57 8.43 
7 8 45.49 10.51 
8 8 51.76 12.24 
9 8 58.35 13.65 
10 8 65.24 14.76 
11 8 72.41 15.59 
12 8 79.85 16.15 
13 8 87.54 16.46 
14 8 95.47 16.53 
15 8 103.63 16.37 
16 8 112.01 15.99 
17 8 120.60 15.40 
18 8 129.40 14.60 
19 8 138.39 13.61 
20 8 147.58 12.42 
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5.  Wheat production, cost, and profit when price of wheat is $9/bushel. 
(1) 
Wheat  
Production 
(1,000 bushels) 
(2) 
Price  
($/bushel) 
 
(3) 
Cost 
 = 2 X (1)1.4+15 
($ 1,000) 
(4) 
Profit  
= (1)X(2)-(3) 
($1,000) 
0 9 15.00 -15.00 
1 9 17.00 -8.00 
2 9 20.28 -2.28 
3 9 24.31 2.69 
4 9 28.93 7.07 
5 9 34.04 10.96 
6 9 39.57 14.43 
7 9 45.49 17.51 
8 9 51.76 20.24 
9 9 58.35 22.65 
10 9 65.24 24.76 
11 9 72.41 26.59 
12 9 79.85 28.15 
13 9 87.54 29.46 
14 9 95.47 30.53 
15 9 103.63 31.37 
16 9 112.01 31.99 
17 9 120.60 32.40 
18 9 129.40 32.60 
19 9 138.39 32.61 
20 9 147.58 32.42 
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6. Profits when price of wheat is $5/bushel-$9/bushel. 
Wheat 
Production 
Profit 
P = $5 P = $6 P = $7 P = $8 P = $9 
0 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 
1 -12.00 -11.00 -10.00 -9.00 -8.00 
2 -10.28 -8.28 -6.28 -4.28 -2.28 
3 -9.31 -6.31 -3.31 -0.31 2.69 
4 -8.93 -4.93 -0.93 3.07 7.07 
5 -9.04 -4.04 0.96 5.96 10.96 
6 -9.57 -3.57 2.43 8.43 14.43 
7 -10.49 -3.49 3.51 10.51 17.51 
8 -11.76 -3.76 4.24 12.24 20.24 
9 -13.35 -4.35 4.65 13.65 22.65 
10 -15.24 -5.24 4.76 14.76 24.76 
11 -17.41 -6.41 4.59 15.59 26.59 
12 -19.85 -7.85 4.15 16.15 28.15 
13 -22.54 -9.54 3.46 16.46 29.46 
14 -25.47 -11.47 2.53 16.53 30.53 
15 -28.63 -13.63 1.37 16.37 31.37 
16 -32.01 -16.01 -0.01 15.99 31.99 
17 -35.60 -18.60 -1.60 15.40 32.40 
18 -39.40 -21.40 -3.40 14.60 32.60 
19 -43.39 -24.39 -5.39 13.61 32.61 
20 -47.58 -27.58 -7.58 12.42 32.42 
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Figure 7: Setting 1 Figure 8: Setting 2
Figure 9: Setting 3 Figure 10: Setting 4
Figure 11: Setting 5
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